We investigate a multi-period contest model in which a contestant's present success gives an advantage over a rival in the future. How this win advantage a¤ects contestants'e¤orts, and whether the laggard gives up or keep on …ghting are key issues. We …nd that the expected e¤ort of the laggard will always be higher than the rival at some stage in the series of contests, and this is most likely to happen when at a large disadvantage or at a late stage in the series.
Introduction
Winning a competition may result not only in a prize, but also an advantage in subsequent competitions. Consider, for example, competitions for research grants. While the successful applicant for a grant may harvest all the direct bene…ts that the research money awarded provides, there may also be an extra bene…t from winning: carrying out the research that the original grant facilitated makes for increased chances to win in future grant competitions. In this way, an early competition for a prize implies that there will be advantaged and disadvantaged participants in subsequent competitions. The question is how contestants'incentives to put in e¤ort in such sequential competitions vary over time as successes and failures are recorded.
In order to understand the dynamics of competitions with win advantages, we develop in this paper a two-player, multi-period contest model where, in each period, there is a prize to win. In this model, a win in today's contest implies a headstart in future contests. We point out two forces that interact in explaining contestants' incentives across time. On one hand, starting from a symmetric situation, a win to one contestant lowers both players'incentives to put in e¤ort, but more so for the disadvantaged player -the laggard. This is because the headstart enables the advantaged player -the leader -to lay back a bit and still stand a good chance to win again, so that also the laggard pulls back somewhat.
On the other hand, there is an extra value of winning for the leader, since a win means he will also be a leader in the future, while a win for the laggard will at best even the score. This extra value dampens the laggard's incentives to put in e¤ort. However, the value of winning falls over time in a …nite game, simply because there are fewer future contests left. Eventually, therefore, the disincentives for the leader from having headstart dominates the laggard's disincentives from facing an opponent with an extra value from winning, so that, towards the end of the sequence of contests, the laggard will be the high performer.
Above, we mentioned one instance of a dynamic win advantage, one that occurs in competitions for research grants: Winning an early grant enhances the chance to win again in the competition for later grants. But such win advantages can also be expected to occur in a number of other contexts. In sales-force management, it is customary to give awards to the Seller of the Month and the like. And in such sales forces, it is not uncommon for the more successful agents to be given less administrative duties, better access to back-o¢ ce resources, more training than the less successful, and better territories; see, e.g., Skiera and Albers (1998) , Farrell and Hakstian (2001) , and Krishnamoorthy, et al. (2005) . Another source of win advantage could be successful agents having access to di¤erent prizes than less successful ones (Megidish and Sela, 2014) . A further source of win advantage may be psychological (Krumer, 2013) . Experimental studies by Reeve, et al., (1985) and Vansteenkiste and Deci (2003) show that winners feel more competent than losers, and that winning facilitates competitive performance and contributes positively to an individual's motivation. 1 The sequence of contests that we model in this paper gives, as noted, rise to the creation of a leader and a laggard based on dynamic win advantages. Another model of multi-period contests featuring leaders and laggards is that of a race, or a best-of-t contest. In a race, the overall winner is the …rst to win t stage contests; see Harris and Vickers (1987) for an early analysis and Konrad (2009) for an overview.
2 Naturally, the winner of the …rst stage becomes the leader in the second, in the sense of having fewer stages left to complete the game. This leader has a much …rmer grip on the rest of the game than the leader has in our context. Results di¤er in the two set-ups, not surprisingly. While the laggard is strongly discouraged in a race, he is much more interested in staying and keep on …ghting in our setting. 3 Two particularly relevant analyses of races are by Konrad and Kovenock (2009) and Krumer (2013) . Both these studies include prizes in the stage game, in addition to the grand prize to the overall winner, and show how such stage prizes mitigate the laggard's discouragement, a result which is in line with what we …nd here. Krumer (2013) introduces, in addition, a win advantage in that the loser of the …rst contest gets handicapped in the second. 4 In Clark, et al. (2015) we explore the consequences of dynamic win advantage, similar to the one we study here, when players meet in a sequence of Tullock contests. In Clark and Nilssen (2013) , the advantage in future contests does not stem from winning today, but rather from e¤orts exerted today.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, whereas Section 3 looks at a single-stage contest with an advantaged player. With the help of the preliminary results in Section 3, the equilibrium is then characterized in Section 4. In Section 5, we go on to discuss various aspects of how the equilbrium play evolves in this game. In Section 6, we present a number of extensions to our analysis. In particular, we discuss win advantages as headstarts versus handicapping in Section 6.1, the e¤ect of players'discounting future payo¤s in Section 6.2, games where stage prizes vary across time in Section 6.3, and long games in Section 6.4. Section 7 concludes. The proofs of most of our results, as well as some elaborations, are relegated to an Appendix.
Sequential contests
There are two identical players, i = 1; 2, who compete in a series of T 2 all-pay auctions for a prize of v in each contest by making irreversible outlays x i;t 0, t = 1; 2; ::::; T . The probability of winning for player 1 in contest t depends on current e¤ort as well as on the history so far, summarized by the number of wins that player 1 has in the previous t 1 contests. Every previous win makes it possible for him to win the current contest with less e¤ort. In particular, the score for player 1 in contest t is given by the sum of his current e¤ort x 1;t and his cumulated win advantage that winning previous contests confers on him. Denote the win advantage from winning a previous contest by
The upper bound is there to make sure that no subgame can occur in which no e¤ort is exerted.
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After having won m t of the previous t 1 contests, player 1 has a current contest score of x 1;t + m t s, whilst the other player has a score of x 2;t + (t 1 m t )s. The contestant with the larger score wins the current contest; in particular, player 1 wins if x 1;t + m t s > x 2;t + (t 1 m t )s. The win probability for player 1 in contest t can thus be written as:
where m 1 = 0. The probability of player 2 winning is de…ned similarly.
For the analysis that follows, it is convenient to think of the net number of wins that a player has achieved. For player 1, de…ne this as M t := m t (t 1 m t ) = 2m t t + 1. Without loss of generality, we shall assume that M t 0. Now the probability that player 1 wins contest t can be written 5 See Sections 6.3 and 6.4 for discussions of some cases where this restriction is lifted. 4 p 1;t = 8 < :
Thus, having the larger number of net wins in the past gives player 1 a headstart in contest t, and increasingly so the more net wins he has.
At contest t, the maximum number of net wins for player 1 is t 1, meaning that this player has won all of the previous t 1 contests. If player 1 has won all but one of the previous t 1 contests, then his net win advantage is t 3, whereas the net win advantage is t 5 if player 1 has won all but two of the previous contests, and so on.
A single contest with advantage
To get to grips with the series of contests, it is instructive to …rst look at one. Consider a single all-pay auction contest in which one player is advantaged in the double sense of achieving a probability of winning with a lower e¤ort than the rival and having a larger value of the prize if he wins. Two players compete over a prize of value v 1 = v + a for player 1 and v 2 = v for player 2, where v > 0 and a 0, by making irreversible outlays x i ; i = 1; 2; the marginal cost of an outlay is …xed at 1. The probability that player 1 wins is given by
where z 0 is a bias parameter indicating a headstart to player 1. The expected payo¤ for player 1 is then given as
with that of player 2 de…ned similarly. Let F i (x i ) be the cumulative distribution function of player i's mixed strategy, i = 1; 2. The following Proposition characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium (Clark and Riis, 1995; Konrad, 2002) .
ii) If z < v, then the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game is
In this equilibrium, the expected amounts of e¤ort of the players are
expected net surpluses are E 1 = z + a; and E 2 = 0;
and probabilities of winning are
Quite unsurprisingly, we see from (7) that the advantaged player has more to gain from the contest. More interestingly, we see from (4) and (5) that the disadvantaged player 2 on one hand has a higher probability of being inactive but that he, conditional on being active, has a higher expected e¤ort. This translates, by way of (6), into the following:
The disadvantaged player has the larger expected e¤ort of the two if and only if
This says that the laggard has more e¤ort than his rival when his disadvantage in terms of the value of winning is su¢ ciently weak relative to the prize and the disadvantage in terms of the win probability. This is evident from (4) and (5): whereas v and z a¤ect the two players more or less in the same manner, a a¤ects the disadvantaged player's e¤ort onlythe more disadvantaged he is in terms of the value of winning, the higher is the probability that he is inactive.
These results are used in the next sections to solve and analyze our model. In terms of the series of contests, z relates to the win advantage in a particular contest, whilst a will be the extra amount that the leader can win in the continuation of the game.
Equilibrium
The model is solved by backwards induction to …nd a Nash equilibrium at each stage of the game, using the results from the previous section. We present the structure of the solution for contest T , and then for a contest t 2, before solving for the …rst contest, and thus for the full game.
Consider …rst the …nal contest T . Let expected payo¤ be given by the function u i;T (M T ). Since this is the end of the game, expected payo¤s for the leader and laggard, respectively, are
In the language of Proposition 1, this is a case where a = 0 and z = M T s. Thus, expected e¤orts and payo¤s in equilibrium are
Note that, from (9) -and in line with Corollary 1 -we can state the following:
Corollary 2 The laggard has the higher e¤ort in the last contest for any M T 1.
Furthermore, total expected e¤ort in contest T is
If M T = 0, so that each player has won equally many of the previous contests, then the game in this last contest is symmetric and we have
Consider next any contest t 2 f2; :::; T 1g in which M t 1, i.e., player 1 has at least one more win than player 2 so far. The expected payo¤ for player 1 is now given by:
That is, either he wins, receives the prize v for this contest, and improves his score; or he loses, receives no prize, and worsens his score. Quite straightforwardly, we can rewrite this as
where
Note that, if M t = 1, then Eu 1;t+1 (M t 1) = 0, since contest t + 1 becomes symmetric if the advantaged player 1 loses contest t in this case.
Player 2 is at a disadvantage, being at least one net win down. If he wins the current contest, then he gains the stage prize v and improves his score, or rather worsens the score of his rival. But even with a win, he will continue as the disadvantaged player earning zero, or at best -if winning at M t = 1 -getting even, but still earning zero. Thus, the payo¤ to player 2 is given by Eu 2;t (M t ) = (1 p 1;t ) v x 2;t :
At contest t, z = M t s measures the bias in the probability of winning, and a = a t is the extra prize that player 1 has, relative to player 2, from winning the current stage. Note that the advantaged player has an expected gross payo¤ of Eu 1;t+1 (M t 1), no matter the outcome of the stage contest.
If M t = 0, then the game is symmetric. Neither player has a bias in the win probability, implying that the expected equilibrium payo¤ from the current stage is zero. In this case, the expression for player i's payo¤ needs to be modi…ed to
since the continuation payo¤ of losing from this state is 0. In this case, the contest is symmetric over a prize of v + Eu 1;t+1 (1) for each player, and each player has an expected e¤ort of
with an expected payo¤ of 0. Since, by de…nition, M 1 = 0, (11) holds for the …rst contest at t = 1. Proposition 2 summarizes the equilibrium expected e¤orts and expected payo¤s of the T sequential contests. The proof, which is based on Proposition 1, is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 In a contest t 2 f2; :::; T g with M t 1, equilibrium expected e¤orts of the players are
with equilibrium expected payo¤s
Eu 2;t (M t ) = 0:
In a contest t with M t = 0, including contest 1, equilibrium expected e¤orts and payo¤s are
Note, from (15), that there is a hard …ght to win the …rst contest, where total expected e¤orts are v + 1 2 sT (T 1).
Analysis
Below, we present a number of results on the equilibrium established in Proposition 2. Our …rst results concern equilibrium behavior at or near symmetry, whereas subsequent results focus on equilibrium play in various cases of asymmetry.
At the outset, t = 1, the contest is symmetric. As is clear from (15), the contestants have expected e¤orts that far exceed the value of the stage prize v, since they both want to become the advantaged player in contest 2, with the possibility of compounding this early win advantage. The expected payo¤ in equilibrium for the game as a whole is zero, so that the players compete away the whole surplus in the course of the game. This leads to the following Corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 3 Total expected e¤orts over the T contests are vT .
In any symmetric state, where M t = 0, equation (15) indicates that there is intense competition to get the game onto a favorable track. The winner of the contest in a symmetric state will enter the continuation a leader, while the loser becomes laggard. With these roles being assigned in this manner, incentives to provide e¤orts fall. In fact, we have the following.
Corollary 4 Suppose there is symmetry in contest t 2 f1; :::; T 1g, i.e., M t = 0. Then (i) total expected e¤orts in contest t are greater than v; and (ii) total expected e¤orts in contest t + 1 are less than v s.
Actually, there can be symmetry only in odd-numbered contests: It is only when t 1 is even that the gross number of previous wins can be the same for the two players at contest t so that symmetry entails. As time goes by, symmetry means less expected e¤orts. This is seen directly from (15) which is decreasing in t. We have:
Corollary 5 Total expected e¤orts in symmetric contests, where M t = 0, decrease over time.
Intuitively, the less future there is after a contest, the less value there is to becoming the leader. To illustrate this, consider an example.
Example 1 v = 1; T = 8; s = 0:05 Write EX t (0) = Ex 1;t (0) + Ex 2;t (0). This gives the following table of total expected e¤ort for tied states:
We turn next to asymmetric contests. When asymmetry occurs, two factors play a role: the bias in the probability function, z t = M t s, and the di¤erence a t in the value of winning between the two players. As shown in the Appendix, the latter equals
Remarkably, it does not depend on how big the lead of the leader is, i.e., on M t . But it does increase in both the time left at t and the win advantage s. Whereas an increase in the bias z t decreases the expected e¤orts of both players, increasing the value di¤erence a t only a¤ects the expected e¤ort of the laggard, and negatively so, according to Proposition 1. Hence, the lead in contest t, as measured by M t , reduces the expected e¤ort of both the leader and the laggard; whereas the fact that the leader has more to gain due to a positive continuation payo¤ only reduces the e¤ort of the laggard. The expected payo¤ of the advantaged player from contest t has a simple form, as indicated by (14) . In this expression, T t + 1 is the number of contests remaining when we reach contest t. Hence, the expected payo¤ in equilibrium to the player with a net win advantage is conveniently expressed as a function of the number of remaining contests, the number of net wins at that stage, and the size of the advantage per win.
When it comes to the relative expected e¤orts of the leader and the laggard, we can use Proposition 2 together with Corollary 1 to show the following two results:
Corollary 6 In any contest t 2 where M t 1, the laggard has higher expected e¤ort than the leader if and only if
6 See the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix.
Corollary 7 When T = 3, the expected e¤ort of the laggard is larger than the leader at t = 2.
Together, Corollaries 2 and 7 deal with cases of short series of contests. When the series consists of two contests, the laggard will always exert more e¤ort in expectation than the leader in the …nal contest. When the series consists of three contests, the laggard will always have more expected e¤ort than the leader in the second contest, and also in the …nal one, should he still be disadvantaged at this stage. From (12) and (13), it can be veri…ed that the win advantage, as measured by M t , reduces the expected e¤ort of the leader by more than the laggard. Modifying this e¤ect is the fact that the winner of the …rst contest has more to …ght for, as measured by a 2 , which is zero when T = 2, and 2s when T = 3. Hence there is no e¤ect on the expected e¤ort of the laggard through this channel in the former case, and a negative e¤ect in the latter. In sum, however, the expected e¤ort of the leader falls more in such short series of contests.
Corollary 6 deals with the more general case. From this we can conclude that the laggard in expectation has more e¤ort than the leader in cases where he is at a large disadvantage (large M t ), there are a low number of contests left (low T t), the win advantage is high, and the stage prize v is low.
These results re ‡ect the …ndings in Section 3 above: When there are relatively few contests left, the di¤erence in valuation between winning and losing, a t , becomes small. The value of a t a¤ects the laggard's e¤ort negatively but does not a¤ect the leader's e¤ort, whereas the bias M t a¤ects both expected e¤orts negatively. It can easily be veri…ed that the negative e¤ect that increasing M t has on the leader's e¤ort is larger in magnitude than the reduction in that of the laggard. Hence the leader slacks o¤ by more than the laggard is discouraged following an increase in the net win. The role of the size of the win advantage s is more subtle, since it leads to more bias in the contest success function, causing less e¤ort by both competitors, at the same time as it increases a t which reduces only the laggard's e¤ort. The larger is s, the more a t falls in each successive contest, which raises the e¤ort of the laggard. Hence, although increases in M t and s lead to a higher likelihood that the laggard will have more e¤ort, they work through di¤erent channels.
Our results are partly driven by the fact that competitors can win a prize at each stage. This will generally raise the expected e¤ort level for both players. The comparative-static properties of (12) and (13) show that an increase in v will tend to raise the expected e¤ort of the leader relative to the follower when there are many contests left, and that the laggard's e¤ort will be raised the most in later stages of the contest. Early in the series of contests, a leader has a great deal to …ght for, since a t = 2s (T t) is large, and increasing v strengthens this e¤ect. Later on, a t falls, giving the laggard more to …ght for.
The following Proposition sums up results on how the relative expected e¤orts of leader and laggard develop for games of more than three rounds; the proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Suppose T 4.
(i) There is always one contest t in the series such that t T 1, M t 1, and Ex 2;t (M t ) > Ex 1;t (M t ).
(ii) If t T 1, M t 1, and
Part (i) of this Proposition states that the expected e¤ort of a laggard will always be larger than that of the advantaged player at some stage in the series of contests before the …nal stage. The intuition is based upon the combination of two e¤ects: the bias which reduces both e¤orts, and that of the leader more, and the reduction in the continuation payo¤ for the leader in the series, which encourages the laggard.
Part (ii) states that, if the laggard has more expected e¤ort in contest t and loses, then he will also have more expected e¤ort in the following contest. The transition from contest t to t + 1 here implies an increased win bias causing more slacking o¤ by the leader, while the progression of the contest lowers the continuation value of the leader.
Part (iii) looks at the case in which the leader has the more expected e¤ort in contest t; should he lose this contest, then, given that he is still advantaged, he will continue to have the more e¤ort in the next contest, as long as the game by then has not reached the …nal contest; recall that the laggard always has more e¤ort in contest T . In this case, the transition of the contest from t to t + 1 implies a smaller win bias; both expected e¤orts increase, a¤ecting the leader more.
Part (iv) looks at the case in which the laggard has more expected e¤ort in a contest; if he wins the contest and is still disadvantaged, then it is possible for this player to have less expected e¤ort than the rival in the next contest.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3 can be combined to show that the sign of the di¤erence in e¤orts of the players is invariant to loss in the following sense:
Irrespective of who has the more expected e¤ort in contest t, with M t 2, if this player loses that contest, then he will have more expected e¤ort also in contest t + 1,unless t = T 1.
Many trajectories of the game are possible, of course, depending upon who wins each stage. One extreme case is that of the "unluckiest loser", i.e., a player who has lost each contest to date; correspondingly, his opponent is the "luckiest winner". Suppose that, at the start of contest t, player 2 has lost each previous contest so that M t = t 1. Despite his bad luck, he will never give up, however. In fact, as Corollary 2 shows, he will eventually have the higher expected e¤ort, even after a losing streak. And Corollary 7 tells us that, for T = 3, the unluckiest loser will have the higher expected e¤ort already at contest 2. The next two Propositions extend this discussion to longer series of contests.
Proposition 4 notes that, if the condition in (1) is strengthened, then the expected e¤orts of the leader and the laggard in this trajectory move in opposite directions over time.
Proposition 4 Suppose that, at every contest t, M t = t 1, meaning the same player wins all contests.
(i) The luckiest winner's expected e¤ort decreases over time.
(ii) If
then the unluckiest loser's expected e¤ort increases over time.
As we see from (12) and (13), increasing the leader's advantage by an increase from M t to M t+1 = M t + 1 lowers both players'expected e¤orts. But at the same time, this decreases the value of being leader, which again lifts the unluckiest loser's e¤ort. Under the condition in (19), the latter e¤ect is the stronger and the unluckiest loser puts in more and more e¤ort over time, in expectation.
Proposition 5 shows that, even without the condition in (19), there will always come a time, before the penultimate contest, at which the e¤ort of the unluckiest loser outstrips that of his winning opponent. Furthermore, the laggard who keeps losing will have more expected e¤ort for the duration of the contest. The proofs of both these Propositions are in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 Suppose that T 5.
(i) There exists a b t 2 f3; :::; T 2g such that, if M t = t 1 for some t 2 f2; :::; T g, then Ex 1;t (M t ) > Ex 2;t (M t ) if t < b t, and Ex 2;t (M t ) > Ex 1;t (M t ) if t > b t.
(ii) The time b t is weakly decreasing in s. It is also weakly increasing in T , at a rate less than 1.
In part (i) of Proposition 5, we …nd a contest, denoted by b t, such that the expected e¤ort of the unluckiest loser will outstrip that of the leader. Furthermore, continuing to lose gives a higher e¤ort in expectation from the laggard.
The …rst e¤ect in part (ii) of Proposition 5 says that the crossing of expected e¤ort will be earlier, the higher is s. This is due to the fact that a large s gives both a large win bias in the contest success function and a large continuation value of winning to the leader. The former e¤ect makes both players exert less e¤ort, with the larger e¤ect on the leader. The latter e¤ect makes the leader's continuation value fall quickly so that the leader has less to gain from successive wins. This encourages even the unluckiest loser.
That b t is weakly increasing in T means that the larger the total number of contests in the game, the longer it will take before the e¤ort of the unluckiest loser is larger than the leader. However, the number of periods remaining when this happens is also larger the total number of contests since, by part (ii) of Proposition 5, T b t is weakly increasing in T .
The two Propositions are illustrated in Figure 1 , where we record the expected e¤orts of the unluckiest loser and the luckiest winner for our Example, where T = 8, v = 1, and s = 0:05; note that the example satis…es condition (19).
Initially both players have a high expected e¤ort in order to become the advantaged player from contest 2 on. After this, the expected e¤ort of each player falls, with the loser of the …rst contest having the larger fall. As the bias increases, the luckiest winner decreases expected e¤ort successively; this e¤ect also exerts downward pressure on the expected e¤ort of the laggard, but the positive e¤ect -that winning matters less and less to the advantaged player -outweighs this. Hence, the e¤ort of the laggard increases across contests. In the example, the unluckiest loser has the larger expected e¤ort in each period from t = 5 on. Figure 2 plots the number of contests remaining from the time at which the e¤ort of the laggard is largest (denoted R in the …gure), using as before v = 1; s = 0:05. When T = 8, there are three contests remaining after crossing (as illustrated in Figure 1) ; when T = 15, there are eight remaining contests, and so on. 
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In this Section, we discuss four departures from the basic model. In Section 6.1, we allow the win advantage to materialize as a combination of headstart and handicapping, thus departing from the contest success function in (2). In Section 6.2, we discuss how the equilibrium would be a¤ected by players discounting future payo¤s. In the …nal two sections, we depart in various ways from the assumption in (1) that put a restriction on how the win advantage, the length of the game, and the stage prize are related. In Section 6.3, we study a sequence of all-pay auctions where prizes vary across time, making it necessary to allow the prize in a single contest to breach that assumption. In Section 6.4, we consider long games, where T v s + 1.
Headstart vs handicapping
In our main analysis, the e¤ect of a win in today's contest is to create a headstart for the winner in future contests. It can be argued that this is a narrow view of such a win advantage. An alternative is to allow for the win advantage to take the form in part of a headstart for the winner and in part of a handicap for the loser. In order to model this, let us replace the contest success function in (2) with the following:
where b 2 [0; 1]. This case can be viewed as giving the win advantage both an additive component, on the lefthand side of (20), and a multiplicative component on the righthand side. In the terminology of Konrad (2002) , such an additive advantage is a headstart for player 1, while the multiplicative disadvantage is a handicap for player 2. This set-up collapses to our earlier case when b = 1. The higher is b, the more of the win advantage comes as a headstart and correspondingly less as a handicap. We impose the following restriction on parameters:
which is a modi…cation of (1) to the present case. Note that, for b < 1, (21) is stricter than (1) if and only if v > 1, and that it reduces to (1) when b = 1. With this restriction, we can carry out an analysis parallel to the one we have above. In particular, the restriction allows us to use Lemma A.1 in the Appendix, which extends our Proposition 1 and extends a result of Konrad (2002) .
For an illustration, consider the case of T = 3 with the win advantage creating both a headstart and a handicap, such as in (20) . In contest 3, in case of symmetry, M 3 = 0, each player's expected e¤ort is v 2 , and his expected net payo¤ is zero. In case of asymmetry in that contest, M 3 = 2. By Lemma A.1, the expected payo¤ to the leader is 2s [b + v (1 b)].
Consider next contest 2. Here, there is a leader for sure, with M 1 = 1. The value of winning is
The leader's expected net surplus is
Thus, in contest 1, the value of winning is the above plus the prize in that contest, v, that is,
Note that, at b = 1, this becomes v +3s. Moreover, this value increases as b decreases, i.e., as more weight is put on handicapping relative to headstart, if and only if v > 1. Each player's expected e¤ort in contest 1 is
Corollary 2 still holds in this setting, by Corollary A.2 in the Appendix, since also now a T = 0. However, other results cannot be expected to carry over to the present case without further conditions. Consider, for example, Corollary 7 on the relative e¤orts of the players in the second contest of a three-contest game. Combining Corollary A.2 in the Appendix with the expression for the value of winning the second contest, in (22) above, we …nd that the laggard has the larger expected e¤orts in the second contest if and only if
This puts a lower limit on the win advantage in order for the laggard to exert more e¤ort than the leader in the second contest of a three-contest game. Combining this with the upper limit in (21), we have in fact that a value for the win advantage s, satisfying both the constraints in (21) and (23) , the opposite of Corollary 7 is true: the leader has the higher expected e¤orts in the second contest of a three-contest game.
Discounting
We so far simpli…ed the analysis by disregarding players' discounting of future payo¤s. Suppose, alternatively, that the players use a common discount factor 2 (0; 1]. As shown in the Appendix, the leader's extra value of winning in contest t now is a t = 2s 1
which is increasing in for t T 2 and approaching 2s (T t) as approaches 1.
In Proposition 2, this implies that the laggard's expected e¤ort in contest t, rather than (13), becomes
thus, the more discounting, the higher is the laggard's expected e¤orts for contests t T 2. The leader's expected payo¤ in contest t, in (14), becomes, from (A11) in the Appendix,
Note that, as before, a T = 0 and a T 1 = 2s, so that Corollaries 2 and 7 still hold. Corollary 6 is modi…ed, in that the condition in (18) becomes
Thus, we can add heavy discounting to the factors, discussed in Section 5, leading to the laggard having more expected e¤ort than the leader.
Varying prizes
In the main analysis, we assume that there is a prize of value v in each contest. Allowing this prize to vary across the contests does not have a too strong e¤ect on the outcome of the game so long as the contest prize in each contest, denoted v t , still adhers to condition (1) so that, for each contest t, v t s (T 1). If this is not the case, there is a possibility that the leader's lead will be so great that the laggard concedes and the players exert no e¤ort at all in one or more of the contests, in line with part (i) of Proposition 1. In order to explore the possible outcomes when prizes vary, consider the case of T = 3. Let v t 0 be the prize in contest t 2 f1; 2; 3g. Suppose the contest designer has a total budget of 1 to spend in total in the three contests, so that v 1 + v 2 + v 3 = 1, implying v 3 = 1 v 1 v 2 , and assume that s 2 0; 1 6 . The equilibrium outcome of this game is illustrated in Figure 3 , which describes the distribution of prizes in (v 1 ; v 2 ) space; given the …xed total prize budget, the third prize, v 3 = 1 v 1 v 2 , is measured by the distance from the v 1 + v 2 = 1 line. Details of the analysis of this case are in the Appendix. We can delineate four di¤erent areas in Figure 3 in which the game is played out di¤erently.
If 1 v 1 2s v 2 s, so that we are in area I of Figure 3 , then each player exerts expected e¤ort of 1 2 in contest 1, while no e¤orts are exerted in contests 2 and 3, so that total expected e¤ort in the game is 1. In this case, both v 2 and v 3 are so small, relative to the win advantage s, that they are not worth …ghting for for the player losing contest 1.
If v 2 < 1 v 1 2s at the same time as v 2 s, so that we are in area II in Figure 3 , then each player's expected e¤ort in contest 1 is (v 1 + v 2 + 2s) =2. In contest 2, no player exerts e¤ort and the leader wins that contest for certain. In contest 3, however, both the leader and the laggard exert positive expected e¤orts with a total expected e¤ort of 1 v 1 v 2 2s. Thus, total expected e¤ort across the three contests is again 1. In this case, it is v 1 and v 2 that are small. E¤orts are exerted in contest 1, mainly in order to obtain the win advantage and get in position before the showdown in contest 3, where the big prize is.
If v 2 1 v 1 2s, as well as v 2 > s, so that we are in area III in Figure  3 , then each player exerts in expectation (1 v 2 + s) =2 in contest 1. In contest 2, expected e¤orts of leader and laggard are
respectively. Now, two possibilities arise. One is that the laggard wins contest 2, so that the game is back to symmetry in contest 3 with total expected e¤ort at 1 v 1 v 2 . The other possibility is another win by the leader, increasing his accumulated win advantage so much that he wins contest 3 without further e¤orts. As shown in the Appendix, when taking into account the win probabilities in contest 2, we …nd that the total expected e¤ort in this game is again 1. In this case, v 2 is big enough for there being something to …ght for in contest 2, while v 3 is so small that the laggard's incentives disappear in the event of a second loss. Finally, the case of s < v 2 < 1 v 1 2s corresponds to area IV in Figure  3 and covers that of
discussed in the main analysis. Each player's expected e¤ort in contest 1 is (v 1 + 3s) =2. In contest 2, expected e¤orts of the leader and the laggard are
respectively. In contest 3, if the laggard wins in contest 2, then the game is at symmetry and total expected e¤orts of the players are 1 v 1 v 2 . If the leader wins again in contest 2, then, in contest 3, the leader has a 2s win advantage and total expected e¤orts in that contest are 1 v 1 v 2 2s. Again, as shown in the Appendix, total expected e¤orts in the game are 1. In this case, both v 2 and v 3 are large enough that a player has incentives to stay in the game throughout, even if he should lose both contest 1 and contest 2. In summary, we …nd that the outcome of the game that we have discussed in our main analysis is relatively robust to variations in prizes, as long as later prizes do not become too small. It appears that the assumption in (1) can be replaced with the weaker condition s (t 1) < v t , for each t. Thus, for example, any v 1 > 0 in the …rst contest can be allowed.
Long games
We have so far insisted on a game of …nite length. In particular, we have assumed that the game is over after T contests, where T < v s + 1. If this assumption no longer holds, we have to deal with the possibility that the leader's cumulated wins are so many that he can win again with exerting no e¤ort, a phenomenon we saw also in Section 6.3 above. When the stage prize is constant at v across time, the state where one player wins without e¤orts is absorbing and the game will stay in that state throughout.
In order to explore the consequences of win advantages in long games, we go to the extreme case and consider the case of in…nitely long games, i.e., where T = 1. Moreover, we assume, as in Section 6.2, that players discount future payo¤s with a discount factor 2 (0; 1). The value for the leader of reaching a state when he will win all future contests e¤ortlessly is thus V := v 1 . We will stick to an upper limit on the win advantage, though, by assuming that s < v.
The value for the leader of winning has so far been denoted a t and in the analysis above, it has been found to be independent of the leader's net number of wins, M t . This is no longer the case in an in…nite game. De…ne t as the …rst contest at which a player can possibly win e¤ortlessly, i.e., t := v s + 1 . This is also the number of net wins needed in order to achieve the endless streak of e¤ortless wins. De…ne the number of additional net wins needed for the leader to achieve this as L t = t M t . Consider some contest t 0 t 1 in which the leader is one win shy of this endless streak, i.e., where L t 0 = 1. The value of winning for the leader will be V = v 1 . Using (6), we …nd that the laggard's expected e¤ort is somewhere in the interval 0; s (1 ) 1
, depending on where in the interval v s ; v s + 1 we have M t 0 . Clearly, with the de facto end of the game looming ahead, the laggard is severely discouraged. This will also a¤ect contests in which L t is greater than 1, i.e., where M t is less than t 1. This analysis, although incomplete, serves to illustrate that, in in…nite games with win advantages, we obtain an e¤ect similar to that of races, or best-of-t competitions. Long games create a race-like incentive to rush for the big prize V . And our result in Corollary 2, that the laggard eventually has the more e¤ort, clearly does not hold for long games.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined a …nite series of all-pay auctions that are linked through time. Speci…cally, a player who has won more contests than he has lost is assumed to build up a win advantage over the rival, and the more net wins the larger the advantage. In the contest literature, one can say that we endogenize the size of any headstart. The e¤ect captured here may be purely psychological or experience-based, but may also be due to factors outside of the model such as sellers who gain more back-room resources, or researchers with more assistants. The series of contests has a symmetric outset, and we identify e¤ects overlooked in static contest mod-els. Two e¤ects are at work that in ‡uence e¤orts of leaders and laggards. First, a headstart leads both players to exert lower e¤ort in expectation, but a¤ects the laggard most; exerting e¤ort will at best even up the contest, at which point both players will expend much resources to gain the lead. Second, the headstart creates an extra value to the leader by ensuring easier access to future prizes, hence reducing the e¤ort of the laggard further. The relative magnitude of these e¤ects change throughout the series of contests, however, so that, eventually, the laggard has the higher expected e¤ort.
In the series of contests, the whole value of the prize is competed away, as is common in all-pay auctions with a symmetric starting point. The players …ght intensely when the contest is even so that there appears to be overdissipation of the prize in these cases. However, the magnitude of the resource exertion in these cases reduces the further advanced we are in the sequence of contests. There are fewer future prizes to be won in this case, making the value of being the leader lower.
We have focussed on cases in which the laggard may be expected to exert most e¤ort, and …nd this to be most likely when he is at a large disadvantage (due to the leader relaxing), or when there are few contests remaining (since the value of remaining the leader diminishes). Due to the latter e¤ect, the laggard will always be expected to exert most e¤ort in the …nal contest. We can also show that as long as the sequence is long enough (speci…cally, at least four contests), the laggard will be expected to have most e¤ort before the …nal contest. Should he subsequently lose in spite of this, the laggard will have more e¤ort than the leader in the following contest.
We have indeed been able to identify various patterns of expected e¤ort. For example, the loser of a very uneven contest will have more e¤ort in the subsequent contest whether he is leader or laggard. Even a player who loses all previous contests will be expected to have larger e¤ort than the rival at some stage before the …nal contest as long as the series is long enough. These results are in contrast to the race literature in which a disadvantaged player will often simply give up.
We have considered several extensions to out main model to look at the robustness of our conclusions. Whereas our main model de…nes the win advantage as being in the form of a headstart, we investigate an extension in which the advantage may be a handicap, or a combination of headstart and handicap. The laggard can still have a higher e¤ort than the leader in expectation, and this is more likely for a larger handicap, paralleling our previous result. The results of our main model are robust to discounting, but introducing the possibility of an in…nite sequence of contests makes our model more like a race in which an absorbing state may be reached in which the laggard gives up. Finally, we show in an example that the restriction on having an identical prize in each contest can be relaxed, and that our results are robust as long as later prizes are not too small (in which case the laggard would again give up). Our future work will examine this line of enquiry further.
A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider contest T 1. If M T 1 1, then the expected payo¤s in this contest are
Through the win advantage, player 1 has a guaranteed payo¤ of Eu 1;T (M T 1 1) if he loses contest T 1. If player 1 wins contest T 1, then he gets the instantaneous prize v and the continuation value in contest T , with M T = M T 1 + 1. Should player 1 lose contest T 1, then he gets no instantaneous prize but receives the continuation value from the net number of wins M T = M T 1 1 in the next contest.
Since M T 1 1, we have that, if player 2 wins, he receives the instantaneous prize v, and the net win for player 1 is M T 1 1 0 in contest T ; the continuation value for player 2 is zero in the …nal contest anyway.
The extra value to player 1 from winning contest T 1 is thus given by Eu 1;T (M T 1 + 1) Eu 1;T (M T 1 1); commensurate with the notation in Section 3, denote this extra value to winning by a T 1 . Using the results for contest T in the text, we have that a T 1 = 2s; note that this is independent of the number of net wins in this contest. From Proposition 1, we now …nd expected e¤orts and payo¤s in contest T 1 as
Using (7), we can stipulate the form of the equilibrium expected payo¤ for player 1 in contest t to be:
Calculating the expected payo¤s recursively backwards reveals a pattern for the equilibrium expected payo¤ in each contest
:
This is rewritten in the more convenient form (14) in the Proposition. In order to examine the equilibrium expected e¤orts for the advantaged and disadvantaged player, we simply need to identify the parameters in (6) for each contest. The bias term z is M t s, and we need to calculate the di¤erence to the leader from winning and losing the current contest, a t.
It is convenient to consider how a t is determined using (14). From (10), we have:
From (14), we have
Applying (A3) in (A2), replacing M t+1 by …rst M t + 1 and then M t 1, gives
Putting z = M t s and a = a t into (6) gives the expected e¤orts in the Proposition. In order to verify (15), we have, from (14), that
From the text before the Proposition, we have that each player's expected e¤ort at M t = 0 is
where the …rst equality is by the above expression; this proves (15).
A.2 Proof of Corollary 4
Part (i): With M t = 0, total expected e¤ort in contest t is, by equation (15),
where the inequality follows from t < T . Part (ii): It follows that, after a winner is declared in contest t, we have M t+1 = 1. Total expected e¤orts in contest t + 1 are found from equations (12) and (13):
Since 2v > v s, the fraction within square brackets in the second expression is less than 1, and the inequality follows.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i). The laggard has more expected e¤ort if condition (18) is ful…lled. This is least likely to be satis…ed for M t = 1, in which case the condition can be written as t > T v v s :
The laggard having more expected e¤ort means, from (18), that
If the laggard loses, then M t+1 = M t + 1, and the left hand side of the inequality for contest t + 1 can be written as
where the inequality follows since the …rst square-bracketed term is positive by (A4), and the second one is positive by (1).
Part (iii). In contest t, we have M t [v + s (T t)] v(T t) < 0, since the leader has more e¤ort in this period. By the leader losing we get M t+1 = M t 1, and the left hand side of the inequality for period t + 1 becomes
Part (iv). If the laggard has more e¤ort in contest t, then
by (18). If the laggard wins this contest, then M t+1 = M t 1, and the leader has more e¤ort in contest t + 1 if
For the inequalities in (A5) and (A6) to be consistent, we must have
which is clearly true, by (1).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Let M t = t 1. Part (i). The leader's expected e¤ort in (12) is now
, which is decreasing in t by (1).
Part (ii). The laggard's expected e¤ort in (13) is now
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to t, we get
This is positive if the expression inside square brackets is positive, which is the case if both fractions in that expression are greater than one. The …rst fraction is greater than one by (1). The second fraction is also greater than one, as long as (19) holds.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Part (i). Consider contest t, and suppose player 2 has lost all the previous t 1 contest, so that m t = M t = t 1. The di¤erence in e¤ort between leader and laggard is, from Proposition 2, By the assumption in (1), v s (t 1) > 0. It follows that the above expression has the same sign as the one inside curly brackets. Disregarding for now that t is integer, that expression, in turn, is a convex function of t, with negative slope and positive value at zero. It thus has two real roots in t, both positive, which we call t > t > 0. Moreover, Ex 1;t (t 1) Ex 2;t (t 1) < 0 if and only if t > t > t.
In order to prove the Proposition, we need to show that t > T , and that 2 < t < T 1: It is readily veri…ed that 
We …rst show that t > T . Consider By (1), the right-hand-side of the inequality is at most v, whilst the lefthand-side is at least 4v. Hence t > T . We next show that t < T 1. Consider Proof. Player 2 will not spend more than v, so that the maximum spent by player 1 is wv z. If player 1 sets x 1 = 0, then he wins if z > wx 2 so that player 2 will not choose positive e¤ort below ; v . By setting x 1 = wv z, player 1 wins with probability 1 and secures a payo¤ of z + a + (1 w) v, whilst player 2 must expect 0. The expected payo¤ of player 1 is
Write X = z+x 1 w , so that (A9) becomes E 1 = Pr (x 2 < X) (v + a) (wX z) = F 2 (X) (v + a) (wX z) = z + a + (1 w) v:
Solving gives F 2 (X) = v (1 w) + a + wX v + a :
Similarly, for player 2, E 2 = Pr (x 1 < wx 2 z) v x 2 = 0
where Y = wx 2 z. Hence,
Player 2's probability of winning is found from the equation p 2 v Ex 2 = 0, while that of player 1 is p 1 = 1 p 2 .
This result extends Lemma 1 of Konrad (2002) . In order to retain his result, put a = 0. The parallel to Corollary 1 is the following: Corollary A.2 With the contest success function in (A8), the disadvantaged player has the higher expected e¤ort if a < 2vz vw z :
The right-hand side in (A10) decreases in w. Thus, the laggard has more e¤ort than his rival when the handicap is high, i.e., w is low.
A.7 Discounting
Suppose players discount future payo¤s with a discount factor 2 (0; 1]. Discounting will a¤ect the leader's expected value of winning in a straightforward manner: equation (A1), in the proof of Proposition 2, now becomes
Using (10) > 0 -the more periods left, the higher is a t .
A.8 Varying prizes
Here we present details of the analysis of the case when prizes vary over time, discussed in Section 6.3. We start with considering the last contest, t = 3. There are two possibilities, either symmetry, with one win to each player in the previous rounds, or asymmetry, with one player having won both previous rounds. In case of symmetry, M 3 = 0, each player's expected e¤ort is v 3 =2 = (1 v 1 v 2 ) =2, and each player's expected net payo¤ is zero.
In case of asymmetry, M 3 = 2. We need to distinguish between two cases. If v 3 = 1 v 1 v 2 2s, then, by part (i) of Proposition 1, players have zero e¤orts in the last contest and the leader is certain to win, with net payo¤ 1 v 1 v 2 to the leader and zero to the laggard. Otherwise, if
